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ABSTRACT 
Background Since the development of social media, social network sites (SNSs) such as
Facebook and Twitter have been at the centre of privacy controversies and debates.
Meanwhile, users continue to expose their personal information.
Analysis This ethnographic research examines 20 young adults’ privacy practices and their
relationship to privacy when they are using social network sites.
Conclusions and implications The privacy paradox is shaped by various factors, such as
a limited knowledge of institutional surveillance practices, low visibility of these practices in
context, a perception of control over the publication of information, and thin social trust. These
ﬁndings provide empirical support for the application of the contextual integrity approach
on social media and the development of a critical media education even at an adult age.
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RÉSUMÉ
Contexte Depuis le développement des medias sociaux, les réseaux socionumériques (RSN)
tels que Facebook et Twitter ont été au centre des controverses et débats liés à la vie privée.
Cependant, les usagers continuent d’exposer leur information personnelle. 
Analyse Cette recherche ethnographique analyse les pratiques de la vie privée des jeunes
adultes et leur rapport à la vie privée quand ils utilisent les réseaux socionumériques.
Conclusions et implications Le paradoxe de la vie privée est façonné par plusieurs facteurs
tels qu’une connaissance restreinte des pratiques de surveillance institutionnelle, la faible vi-
sibilité de ces pratiques en contexte, une perception de contrôle sur l’information publiée en
contexte et une faible conﬁance sociale. Ces résultats offrent un soutien empirique à l’applica-
tion de l’approche de l’intégrité contextuelle sur les médias sociaux et une éducation critique
aux médias même à un âge adulte.
Mots clés  Médias sociaux; Surveillance; le paradoxe de la vie privée; l’exposition de soi;
l’intégrité contextuelle
Introduction
With the development of social media,1 which are surveillant in nature, privacy con-
cerns arose among the public (Barnes, 2006; Hargittai & Marwick, 2016). Social net-
work sites (SNSs) such as Facebook and Twitter have been at the centre of privacy
controversies and debates. In 2010, the Ofﬁce of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
ﬁled a complaint against Facebook to have the SNS limit the use of information by ap-
plication developers (OPC, 2016). In 2017, the Spanish data regulator ﬁned Facebook
as the SNS had infringed data protection laws; Facebook was accused of not informing
users of the use and purpose of the collection of sensitive data (Lomas, 2017). In an
earlier instance, hackers exposed users’ passwords on Twitter (Cubrilovic, 2009).
Despite these concerns, the trend that has been observed is that users expose
their personal information on SNSs (Brandimarte Acquisiti, & Loewenstein, 2012;
Granjon & Denouël, 2011; Gross & Acquisiti, 2005). Exposure within these technolog-
ical contexts is understood as the action of showing, exposing, rendering visible and
at the same time of being exposed (Ball, 2009). Several media outlets published stories
on social media users who lost their reputation and jobs because of their posts. For ex-
ample, British trainee Kevin Colvin realized that showing too much on Facebook has
negative consequences (see Randall & Richards, 2008). After giving a false reason for
his absence to his employer, he went to a Halloween party and posted a photo of him-
self in a fairy costume on Facebook. One of his colleagues showed the picture to his
supervisor and Kevin was promptly dismissed (see also Reid, 2011). In Canada, 80  stu-
dents from various high schools and CEGEPs in Laval and Québec created a Facebook
group in which they made death threats against their professors (see TVA Nouvelles,
2011). When a TVA Nouvelles reporter questioned students, “Do you think it’s right
that the police and teachers accessed this group?” They said that what they wrote on
Facebook is “private.” (TVA Nouvelles, 2011).
Young adults are the most present on social network sites compared to other co-
horts of users in Québec (Cefrio, 2015, 2017). In 2016, 67 percent of users aged 25 to 44
years old use a social network site such as Facebook, Linkedln, Twitter or Snapchat
(Cefrio, 2017, n =  1,001). There were 64 percent who used Facebook in the province
compared to 57 percent in the rest of Canada (Cefrio, 2017). Québec young adults are
often portrayed by media outlets as being unaware of the privacy risks associated with
exposure online (Radio-Canada.ca, 2013; TVA Nouvelles, 2011). For example, an em-
ployer said that young people often used social network sites to share their “state of
mind and that’s an issue when they are searching for a job” (Radio-Canada.ca, 2013).
Based on data collected from an ethnographic study, using methods of participant ob-
servation and 40  qualitative interviews, 20 Québec young adults’ privacy practices and
relationship to privacy when they were using Facebook and Twitter were examined.
This research explains young adults’ privacy protection strategies on both SNSs and
the factors that shape the privacy paradox. The present study shows that users are un-
aware of the consequences of institutional surveillance practices on privacy, and that
this relates to the fact that notice and consent are problematic on SNSs. These ﬁndings
provide empirical support for the application of the contextual integrity approach on
social media and the development of a critical media education even at an adult age.
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Privacy practices on social network sites
Prior studies showed that social media users are to some extent unaware of privacy
risks. For example, users are disclosing their real names on Facebook and are perceiving
the beneﬁts related to self-exposure rather than the risks associated with such practices
(Gross & Acquisiti, 2005). Further, Brandimarte, Acquisiti, and Loewenstein (2012) ar-
gued that the more students think they have control over the publication of personal
information in context, the less likely they are concerned about privacy risks and the
more they reveal personal information on Facebook.
Other studies focused on the factors that shape self-exposure on SNSs. Tufekci
(2008) conducted a survey of 704  students and discovered that 94.9 percent of them
disclosed their real names on Facebook, while 62.8 percent did so on MySpace. Students
alternated between self-exposure and control of information, because concealment of
their information did not offer them a chance to attract the attention of their audiences.
Boyd and Hargittai (2010) analyzed the practices of young adults from 2009 to 2010
on Facebook. Privacy settings changed during this period. They discovered that users
with greater technical skills frequently changed their privacy settings. Other researchers
found that the exhibitionism of French students on social media sites was part of a
strategic process during which they controlled the visibility of their personal informa-
tion and were searching for recognition (Granjon & Denouël, 2011). Ellison, Vitak,
Steinﬁeld, Gray, and Lampe  (2011) analyzed how social media users balance between
the sharing of personal information and the need to control disclosures. Users who ac-
tivated privacy settings “reported higher perceived bonding and bridging social capital”
(p.  26). Drawing from Putnam (2000, chap.  1, para.  23), bonding social capital is essen-
tial to strengthen reciprocal relationships and the development of solidarity. Bridging
social capital is to provide access to other resources that cannot be obtained from close
friends. It is an asset to succeed. Marwick and Boyd (2011) found that Twitter users ne-
gotiate their identities in order to brand themselves and be “authentic.” Drawing from
the work of Theresa M. Senft, they described this practice as micro-celebrity. Users al-
ternate between self-exposure and self-censorship, as the site does not have the privacy
settings to separate the different audiences.
Scholars have examined users’ privacy concerns. Raynes-Goldie (2010) conducted
an ethnographic study of the privacy practices of 20  Canadian users. Most of them were
concerned about the control of personal information during social interactions (social
privacy). According to the researcher, users care less about the use of personal infor-
mation by institutions and third parties (institutional privacy). Boyd’s (2008) ethno-
graphic study of American teenagers shows that informants feared that authority ﬁgures
such as parents, teachers, or college ofﬁcers might access their personal information.
Barnes (2006) drew attention to the privacy paradox on social network sites.
Teenagers knew the privacy risks linked to MySpace use, but they continued to expose
themselves. Young and Quan Hasse (2013) revisited the privacy paradox. In their study,
far from being naïve, Canadian university students developed various strategies to pro-
tect privacy during social interactions on Facebook. However, no strategies were mo-
bilized to control the use of personal information by institutions and third parties.
Hargittai and Marwick (2016) discovered that American users aged 19 to 35 are aware
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that privacy is networked. Although they protect their privacy during interactions on
social media, they know that other users and institutions can violate privacy. The pri-
vacy paradox is associated with online apathy.
While the literature explains the privacy practices of social media users, we lack
a deeper understanding of users’ relationship to privacy when they are using social
network sites that have different architectures, terms of service, and privacy policies.
Scholars have not examined the factors that shape this relationship. An improved un-
derstanding of privacy practices and users’ relationship to privacy when they are using
different social network sites will inform privacy debates and is important for the de-
velopment of adequate policies that will reﬂect users’ practices (Young & Quan-Hasse,
2013). As mentioned before, Canadians use several social media sites in everyday life
(Cefrio, 2017; Insights West, 2016), and young adults are the most present on social
network sites (Cefrio, 2010, 2014, 2017). In the news, techno-pessimistic discourses
portray young adults’ privacy practices on social media (Radio-Canada.ca, 2013; TVA
Nouvelles, 2011). To address the gap in the literature, this study investigates how young
adults in Québec are negotiating privacy when using Facebook and Twitter, and the
factors shaping their relationship to privacy. It  aims to answer the following two re-
search questions:
RQ 1: How do young adults negotiate privacy when they are using
Facebook and Twitter? 
RQ 2: What are the factors that are shaping their relationship to privacy
on social network sites?
Surveillance, visibility, and privacy
Social media are surveillant in nature, which has consequences on privacy (Trottier &
Lyon, 2012). Institutional surveillance practices are becoming more and more decen-
tralized and networked (Lyon, 2002). In the context of Internet surveillance, Stalder
(2011) identiﬁed two types of practices: back-end and front-end. In the ﬁrst case, back-
end surveillance is supported by servers and databases that are accessible only to web-
site owners. Data collected by website owners and stored in databases, is used to serve
commercial and other purposes and to model interfaces that are more or less easy to
use. Front-end surveillance is the monitoring of users’ activities online, in order to gen-
erate contents (data, metadata) with the help of algorithms, and provide opportunities
to users through these interfaces. Surveillance practices may be visible, invisible, or
have a low visibility during social interactions (Ball, 2009; Marx, 2006). For Brighenti
(2010), different forms of visibility are imposed and negotiated through architectures
that promote the exercise of surveillance. Within this framework, social control is ex-
ercised through website architectures that promote the visibility of personal informa-
tion. Visibility as control is in tension with the forms of visibility that users negotiate
to obtain recognition (visibility as recognition). The rules of visibility that are applied
to personal information will vary depending on the architectures of the websites, their
terms of service (TOS), and their privacy policies. Website owners offer a contract that
users have to either opt out of or opt into. As Nissenbaum (2011) explained, “The gist
of this approach is to inform website visitors and users of online goods and services of
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respective information-ﬂow practices and to provide a choice either to engage or dis-
engage.” (p.  34). The contract is presented in the form of notice and consent (choice)
(Nissenbaum, 2011). Some rules of visibility may change, to the detriment of users’
privacy (Trottier & Lyon, 2012). For example, website owners might add default set-
tings to interfaces without users’ consent. Therefore, unanticipated forms of visibility
provide access to personal information to different audiences, and this may contribute
to privacy violations.
Privacy can refer to “freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s
home, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from
searches and interrogations” (Solove, 2008). Privacy is a “slippery concept  … encom-
passing a variety of meanings” (Viseu, Clement, & Aspinall, 2003, p.  1). The control
approach has often been used to address privacy in relation to technological and com-
munication contexts. Westin (2003) deﬁned privacy as the right of individuals to de-
termine how their personal information can be communicated to others. However, the
boundaries between the “public” and the “private” are rather ﬂuid, and vary depend-
ing on situation or context (Marx 2001). Therefore, context is important when we are
framing privacy. Nissenbaum’s (2011) contextual integrity approach considers that pri-
vacy is contextual and that contexts are governed by informational norms—mainly
norms of appropriateness and distribution. Norms of appropriateness indicate what is
appropriate behaviour in a given context, and norms of distribution refer to the distri-
bution of information. A violation of informational norms can contribute to a violation
of privacy and a lost of integrity of personal information. Davis and Jurgenson (2014)
used the work of Nissenbaum to explain how SNSs are causing collisions and collusions
of contexts. The ﬁrst type of collision happens when SNSs’ architectures allow infor-
mation to seep from one context to the other without users’ consent (e.g., when privacy
settings are by default public). Collusion of contexts occurs when an individual con-
tributes to the seeping of information from one context to the other (e.g., users’ per-
sonal information being exposed by colleagues on Facebook).  Social surveillance is
also practised between peers within SNSs during interactions and can contribute to
an invasion of privacy (Marwick, 2012). On SNSs, privacy can also be violated by a third
party. Etzioni (2015) identiﬁes this process as privacy violation triangulation.
Privacy is also networked, as Hargittai and Marwick (2016) explained: “Privacy is
not an individual process, but rather a collective effort that requires the cooperation
of those with whom we connect on social media, as well as the technological affor-
dances of the social media sites themselves” (p.  3752). In context, privacy is negotiated
by individuals during social interactions. Goffman’s (1973) contributions prove useful
and are associated with the performativity of privacy (Donath, 2007; Marwick & Boyd,
2011). Users will negotiate the boundaries between the “private” and the “public” ac-
cording to the audiences present and thus proceed to the segregation of audiences.
Self-exposure can be voluntary and involuntary and shaped by various factors, as dis-
cussed earlier, including social capital beneﬁts, perception of control over the publica-
tion of information, mimesis of micro-celebrity practices, and internalization of social
control (Brandimarte et  al., 2012; Ellison et  al., 2011; Proulx & Kwok Choon, 2011). Some
privacy protection strategies of users on SNSs are deleting comments on their Facebook
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proﬁle and contacts from the friends list, using social steganography (which is the art
of concealing information to a speciﬁc audience), practising self-censorship on Twitter,
restricting Facebook proﬁles, and sending private messages on Facebook chat (Boyd,
2010; Marwick & Boyd, 2011; Raynes-Goldie, 2010). Privacy negotiation is also a dialec-
tical process. Individuals will try to have control over information they are sharing and
information that comes from others to achieve an optimal level of privacy. They also
want to match the achieved privacy with the desired one (Altman, 1975; Tufekci, 2008).
Methods
From January 2013 to October 2015, this author conducted a virtual ethnographic re-
search study of Québec young adults’ privacy practices.2 Most young adults in Québec
who use SNSs are students (Cefrio, 2012, 2014). After obtaining the certiﬁcate of ethical
acceptability of research on human subjects from my institution, I sent out a call for
participation to students enrolled in a bachelor’s degree program at a university in
Montréal by email, a mean of communication frequently used by students to check up-
dates on their study programs. Recruitment criteria were based on age (18- to 34-years
old) and use of Facebook and Twitter. Upon obtaining users’ consent, I became
Facebook friends with study participants and started following informants’ Twitter ac-
counts. To grasp the online culture (practices, norms, and values), I approached the
Internet as a space where culture is formed and reformed and is embedded in everyday
life (Hine, 2008). Therefore, online and ofﬂine research methods, such as participant
observation, and qualitative open-ended and semi-structured interviews were em-
ployed. I observed the online culture and participated in users’ activities in order to get
a sense of what they are doing and sharing in this context.3
Qualitative interviews proved to be an efﬁcient way to understand online practices
from the point of views of young adults (Spradley, 1979). Open-ended and semi-struc-
tured interviews of 90  minutes were conducted in an ofﬂine context with a total of
20  young adults. The goal was not to have a representative sample of social media users
but rather to understand the privacy practices of this small group of users and infer
privacy patterns. The data saturation criterion was also taken into consideration. The
open-ended one-on-one interviews consisted of an open discussion in front of the com-
puter, with the question: Can you show me what you do on Facebook and Twitter?
The participant and researcher together explored proﬁle pages to grasp uses of both
SNSs. Further, the motivations for self-exposure and privacy protection strategies were
discussed. The terms of service (TOS) and privacy policy pages of both SNSs were also
visited. Informants explained the privacy choices they had made for each SNS.
Data collected during the ﬁrst interview was used to construct the grid for the
semi-structured interview. To understand informants’ relationship to privacy, what
users think of privacy policies, TOS, advertising and applications, the circulation of in-
formation on SNSs, control over personal information, reputation of SNSs in terms of
privacy protection, friendship on SNSs, and the difference between online and ofﬂine
privacy were further explored. The aim was to encourage users to reﬂect on privacy
related to SNSs. Rather than bringing up the relationship between surveillance and
privacy during discussions, informants gave their own impressions on surveillance.
The 40  interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed on separate sheets. Interview
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questions were grouped by topic. Users’ answers for each question were thoroughly
read, and quotations relevant to the two research questions were highlighted and com-
pared with interview data. Both concepts and main themes were identiﬁed. Informal
conversations with research participants were conducted via Facebook Chat to eluci-
date the meaning of interview data and observed phenomena. To protect users’
anonymity, pseudonyms are used throughout the text. Users’ identity on Facebook
posts were blurred using PDF tools. 
Results
The following three sections provide the main ﬁndings of this research on the following
themes: self-exposure and the desire for recognition; privacy protection strategies; and
the privacy paradox.
Self-exposure and the desire for recognition
Self-exposure in the context of Facebook and Twitter uses is related to visibility as
recognition. Participants had joined Facebook in 2007 and had restricted their proﬁles
to friends only. Their social network was composed of close friends, family members,
and acquaintances (see Table  1).
During social interactions, young
adults in this study exposed several
types of personal information on
Facebook, such as selﬁes, photos
showing users’ participation in social
activities, geolocation information,
inside jokes, and online articles, as
well as identiﬁcation information,
such as a proﬁle picture, their actual
name, university, employer, and city
of residence or birth. In addition,
within Facebook groups, they dis-
closed information related to aca-
demic group work. Users employed
the following promotional strate-
gies: 1)  adding ﬁlters to selﬁes on
Instagram before publishing them
on Facebook and identifying peers
and speciﬁc locations as a way to
showcase their social life; 2)  shar-
ing articles and giving importance
to societal issues; 3)  sharing inside
jokes in order to maintain strong
ties. Users projected advantageous
physical attributes, expressed posi-
tive emotions, and showed critical
thinking skills on Facebook.
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Table 1: Participants’ social media statistics 
Participants
Number of
followees
onTwitter
Number of
followers
onTwitter
Number of
Facebook
Friends
Corinne 121 28 338
Elissa 212 28 350
Giliane 139 41 116
Illona 816 1616 580
Joey 14 27 600
Karine 11 9 445
Lana 135 30 328
Léa 120 59 588
Liloo 16 3 476
Lily 270 33 550
Lovna 223 98 545
Ludovic 190 29 438
Maurice 80 8 566
Mira 644 70 448
Molly 226 41 326
Noemie 339 53 431
Romeo 94 27 122
Sebastian 600 150 330
Romeo 94 27 122
Tara 502 28 56
Recognition is obtained during interactions and is mediated by the architecture
of visibility. For example, Sheila shared a photo on Tara’s birthday on her proﬁle (see
Figure  1). She tagged four friends and therefore made visible their identities and loca-
tion. Reciprocity is reﬂected in the mutual appreciation of comments and users’ phys-
ical appearance and the systematic use of smileys. The number of “likes” and
comments represents a form of recognition from online communities. Personal recog-
nition is obtained during social interactions between friends and acquaintances
(Brighenti, 2010). It allows users to get emotional beneﬁts and maintain strong and
weak ties. Further, informants activate the geolocation feature to showcase their social
life and to obtain “likes.” Illona explained:
I just geotag when it’s something fun: a show, for example. I went to New
York, I tagged it. You want to show people something about your life.
When you go to Cancun. You want everybody to know that you’re in
Cancun, so the world knows you have a social life! (Personal interview,
July  4, 2013)
In comparison, users have a public account on Twitter. Most users joined the social
network in 2012 to follow the trend. Their followers, tweets, retweets, and conversations
revolve around personal interests and tastes, such as pop culture, politics, Québec cul-
ture, international news, entertainment, culinary specialties, sport, and everyday situ-
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Figure 1: Sheila’s Facebook post Figure 2: Illona’s tweet
Note: Translated from French: “It was long before the re-
lease of the second album of @LessoeursBoulay, but it
was worth the wait Sweet Jesus, it’s good!”
Figure 3: Elissa’s tweet
Note: Translated from French: “Very beautiful show of
SUUNS. Thank you.”
ations. Informants engage in micro-
celebrity practices (see Marwick & Boyd,
2011, for a deﬁnition of tweet, retweet, fol-
lowers, and followees). Self-branding is
achieved by initiating conversations, tweet-
ing and retweeting during speciﬁc events,
and sharing daily situations and emotions
on Twitter (see Figures  2, 3, and 4). The aim
is to be visible in the Twitter sphere, attract
attention, and obtain recognition from celebrities and strangers.
According to Marwick and Boyd (2011), “the ability to attract and retain attention
are marks of one’s status” (p.  127) in the Twittersphere. Visibility as recognition on
Twitter occurs between strangers during the routine categorization of individuals
(Brighenti, 2010). The fact that their tweets are retweeted or favourited, and the feed-
back that they generate as well as an increase in followers represent the recognition
users obtain from strangers. For example, Mira shared her positive and negative emo-
tions and celebrity tweets:
I retweet about Place des Arts events, I ﬁnd it cool. I advertise a little bit.
People will see that Place des Arts is following me on Twitter. It’s a form
of prestige. It’s fun when they reply to you. I feel a little bit important. Even
Danny Turcotte, he jokes a lot, sometimes I will share crosswords on
Twitter, and he will retweet me. (Personal interview, July  3, 2013)
On Twitter, users judge each other according to their interests, tastes, and tweet
topics. They do not know each other and are not judged on their singularities. Visibility
as recognition allows users to maintain “virtual” ties.
Privacy protection strategies
From social steganography to a restricted profile
The desire to expose oneself is linked to the need to protect one’s privacy (Altman,
1975). Users of social network sites mobilize strategies to protect privacy during social
interactions and to conceal information from a speciﬁc audience. Strategies on
Facebook for social steganography include deleting contacts from their friends’ lists
and sharing private information through Facebook Chat. Informants said:
“I am giving up Pippa, you are the devil!” [she reads]. This is an inside joke.
Pippa my friend, is encouraging me to post information on Facebook as I
told her that I am leaving the site for a while. (Noemie, personal commu-
nication, February  2, 2014)
I am doing a little bit of “cleaning up.” I am deleting friends from my list.
I no longer know them, therefore I am not interested in what they are
doing. I don’t want them to see what I am doing either. (Corinne, personal
interview, March  21, 2013)
My friend is depressed and she expresses her negative emotions all the
time on Facebook. People do not like it, to have people sad all the time.
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Figure 4: Sebastien’s tweet
Note: Translated from French: “No sugar in the
sugar jar, I have to put asparthame in my coffee.
How can people drink that?!! #negativeemotion.”
As I do not want to disturb my Facebook friends, I will not do that. I will
try to make my Facebook page more joyful. There is a boundary that I
built. I  will rather call someone or express myself on the Facebook Chat.
(Elissa, personal interview, June  17, 2013)
Another strategy to protect privacy is self-censorship. Informants do not disclose
“trash” and nude photos on Facebook. If they are “identiﬁed” on this type of photo,
they will remove these “identiﬁcations” by making use of the appropriate settings.
They also do not activate the geolocation feature when they are at home, at their
friends’ place, and at the doctor’s ofﬁce. From their point of view, employers are watch-
ing over Facebook proﬁles. Ludovic said:
I post pictures of me partying, but I am not throwing up on the ﬂoor and
I am not showing my belly on the roof. I am having fun. It takes a crazy
employer to stalk me on Facebook and see how I am partying. It is a cer-
tain fear. I say to myself that an employer can have different political
views than I have and may not want me on his team. (Personal interview,
July  6, 2013)
For Goffman (1973) self-censorship is a strategy that an individual will employ to
hide some facts to an audience: “[A]lthough in certain representations, and even in
certain particular roles, when the actor is in a position to have nothing to hide, there
is usually something that he cannot openly address in all his activities” (p.  66). Self-
censorship is the only privacy strategy on Twitter. From users’ perspective, audiences
on Twitter will not be interested in photos taken at social events. In addition, the ge-
olocation feature is not activated on Twitter. Users fear being stalked by strangers. Illona
explained why she did not activate the geolocation feature on Twitter:
That’s not interesting. There are more people I do not know and it’s a little
creepy. Let’s say I am at home, and someone knows where I live, and I do
not know him. If I have never seen him in my life. On Facebook, I had at
least an interaction with them. On Twitter, people everywhere follow me.
(Personal interview, July  4, 2013)
This strategy of self-censorship is employed when users think that they lack control
over personal information (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016).
Facebook profiles restricted to friends only
Another strategy is having a Facebook account restricted to friends only. The partici-
pants in this study did not read the privacy policy section of the SNS, since Facebook
incorporated some changes with the implementation of the Timeline. They did not
see notices of changes in context. During the interview, young adults found the dis-
courses that explained privacy policies incomprehensible. Users were concerned be-
cause personal information that they thought was restricted to Facebook friends was
by default accessible to a greater audience. Proﬁles were listed by external search en-
gines by default, proﬁle photos were visible to everyone, and applications had access
to personal information without their consent. Young adults experienced collisions of
context (Davis & Jurgenson, 2014). During the interview, users all activated the ade-
quate settings. From their point of view, website owners have something to hide and
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are concealing to users the extent to which personal information is subjected to an in-
visible audience. Informants explained:
I know that at one point they changed their options, but it was written in
the little corner in a small window. Of course, most people will move on.
You’re not going to read—you look at it one by one, it’s long. Then how
it’s done. It’s like thirty lines for not much. You could have a window writ-
ten: “Do I want to make all my information public or private?” That’s it!
Sure they want to make it more complicated than it should be there.
(Sebastian, personal interview, March  18, 2013)
Two hundred and ninety-three applications, I do not know why they are
there. No, I do not know them [she reads the application settings].
Sometimes I think Facebook makes it by default, if you do not see, it puts
it automatically like that. (Lily, personal interview, March  5, 2013)
In addition, participants had heard in the media, in the classroom, and from their
friends that Facebook was endangering privacy. Giliane said: 
In terms of privacy, it’s zero. You can just hope that what you put on your
Facebook, it will not come back to you. Its reputation is not very good in
relation to privacy. It is public as everything can seep out. I keep it in mind.
It’s not like your house, it’s really something that’s open to everyone. If
someone wants to “break into” your account, the information can come
out. (Personal interview, July  8, 2013)
Informants think that it is easier to negotiate privacy within ofﬂine contexts than on-
line. Boundaries are porous online and information can seep from one context to the
other. Users perceived that Facebook architecture mediates social surveillance practices,
and this can contribute to a loss of control over privacy (Marwick, 2012).
The privacy paradox
These results suggest that privacy on SNSs is important for the protection of reputa-
tion and is a way of protecting oneself against social surveillance. On Facebook, users
expect to have control over personal information, though they are aware of some pri-
vacy risks. Privacy violations on Facebook can contribute to a loss of reputation that
could be detrimental to their career. In comparison, publicity is more important than
privacy on Twitter. Privacy is to a certain extent valued but is not a priority. The pri-
vacy paradox is shaped by a limited knowledge of institutional surveillance practices,
the low visibility of institutional surveillance practices in context, the perception of
control over the publication of information in context, and thin social trust in
Facebook friends.
A limited knowledge of institutional surveillance practices
The knowledge of users in this study on institutional surveillance practices and social
surveillance was limited and vague. The idea that “somebody somewhere can have
access to their personal information” was omnipresent. Noemie explained:
From the moment that you post something on Facebook or Twitter, it does
not belong to you. Someone, somewhere will have access to it. You have
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to be cautious. Doing screen shots of pictures, sharing it in another context,
or modifying it is easy. (Personal interview, June  12, 2013)
The collection of personal information for SNS advertising systems and the col-
lection of personal information by third parties are not considered as a privacy threat
but as an exploitation of personal information. Some participants somewhat naively
thought that they had opted out of the Facebook advertising system with AdBlock.
The software is used as a spam blocker. As Ludovic remarked:
What’s strange is that Facebook is free but you have the ads. But then I re-
moved the advertisements. You know AdBlock on Google Chrome, I  put
AdBlock and I no longer see the ads. Facebook is free with no ads [laughs].
We circumvent the system and they will realize that everyone has AdBlock.
(Personal interview, March  6, 2013)
Maurice is the only one who mentioned that federal agencies are monitoring social
media. Young adults were not aware that their Twitter proﬁles are listed by search en-
gines external to the site and that they gave their consent to Twitter to collect their
personal information on third-party sites. This information circulated on the Twitter
user feed, but informants did not see it. They also had never read the privacy policy
section on Twitter. To the question “Who can see your personal information on
Twitter?” Users said:
Everyone. My followers and those who are in the groups with the hash-
tags … (Ludovic, personal interview, March  6, 2013)
My followers, and the people who come to see my page, if there are …
(Elissa, personal interview, March  5, 2013)
It should also be noted that at the time of this study, users were familiarizing them-
selves with Twitter and did not understand the ﬂow of information on the SNS. The
more knowledge users have about surveillance practices, the more they will develop a
critical attitude toward privacy. Marx (2006) explained the relationship between knowl-
edge, our ability to understand, and our ability to undertake reﬂective actions as follows:
Even when we have one or two pieces of information, this may be reveal-
ing when there is general cultural knowledge. Here, visibility does not refer
to what we see concretely, but what we know (or we discover) as partici-
pants in a culture. The success of Sherlock Holmes, for example, rests in
part on his ability to deduce relevant facts from his vast knowledge of cul-
ture and society. He frequently used his general knowledge to understand
and locate a culprit. (p.  103)
Users’ limited knowledge of institutional surveillance practices in the context of SNSs
explains why users in this study were still engaging in self-exposure. Informants did
not expect to have control over the use of their personal information by institutions
and third parties, and they did not mention the threats related to privacy violation by
triangulation.
Low visibility of institutional surveillance practices in context
The low visibility of institutional surveillance practices in context, such as low-proﬁle
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notices of architectural changes, shapes this paradoxical relationship to privacy. Social
control is exercised on SNSs (Proulx & Kwok Choon, 2011). For website owners, the
aggregation and use of data for commercial purposes is more important than users’
privacy, and this could explain the opacity that surrounds notice and consent in the
context of use (Nissenbaum, 2011). The lack of clarity surrounding privacy policies
marginalizes the reﬂexivity of individuals to a certain extent in relation to privacy, as
they may be unaware of architectural changes. This, in turn, can lead to involuntary
exposure of personal information. Ball (2009) explains the relationship between self-
exposure, surveillance, and visibility mechanisms in those terms:
Technical seeing now means that invisible realities, and that which is de-
liberately hidden or secret can become available to view without our
knowledge. Windows on the world become windows on the individual,
and the individual is not guaranteed to realize they are on display. (p.  644)
While surveillance practices appear less visible and distant, their impact on privacy
seems abstract. For Viseu, Clement, and Aspinall (2003), the endangerment of privacy
has an abstract and distant character on a daily basis. Privacy becomes valuable when
there is an invasion. For example, users in this study changed their privacy settings to
make Facebook proﬁles more “private” when they experienced collisions of context.
Once this action was taken, they felt that they had more control over the publication
of information.
The perception of control over the publication 
of information in context
Young adults in this study expressed different perceptions of privacy in relation to
Facebook at three distinct moments. Before exploring the privacy policies section on
Facebook, users were conﬁdent about the state of protection of their proﬁles. The mo-
ment they realized their personal information was exposed by default to an extended
audience, they were concerned and activated the adequate settings. During the second
interview, they highlighted several risks related to social surveillance and said that
nothing was “totally private” on the internet. They were still worried about their pri-
vacy, because the idea that personal information was visible to strangers was always
present. However, users conﬁrmed that they trusted Facebook privacy settings.
Informants thought they had control over the publication of information in context.
The more individuals perceive that they have control over the information published
in context, the more they are likely to continue to expose themselves (Brandimarte
et  al., 2012).
In comparison to Facebook, young adults in this study thought that Twitter had
a better reputation in terms of privacy. Users explained:
People do not really talk about  privacy on Twitter. The “discourses” are
more about Facebook than Twitter. (Giliane, personal interview, July  8, 2013)
I did not hear anything about it. But, really, I think it’s more protected than
Facebook because your tweet, you can block it, and you can even erase it.
Maybe Facebook already has a well-established bad reputation that it’s not
protected. (Illona, personal interview, July  4, 2013)
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Users perceived that a desired level of privacy had been achieved on both sites. From
the perspective of informants, the networked nature of privacy on SNSs is in their
propensity to introduce all sorts of invisible audiences (Boyd, 2008; Hargittai &
Marwick, 2016).
Thin social trust in Facebook friends
Another factor that shapes the privacy paradox is the trust young adults place in their
Facebook friends. The more people trust, the more inclined they are to disclose infor-
mation. Social trust is an important component of SNS interactions. For Putnam
(2000), social trust is deﬁned as trust placed in individuals and not in institutions. In
his analysis of Americans’ sociability during the twentieth century, he was interested
in two forms of trust: thick trust and thin trust. The ﬁrst is the one we place in our
personal circles, usually composed of close friends, relatives, and family. The second
concerns other acquaintances. He noted a decline in trust in the 1960s that was shaped
by individuals’ perceptions of strangers, built through their social experiences and
shaped by psychological traits (paranoia, cynicism, etc.). However, for a more recent
period, Putnam (2000) found that thin trust has begun to develop with the internet
and the emergence of small groups whose activities include, for example, reading or
ﬁghting alcoholism (Alcoholics Anonymous). Individuals are grouped around interests
or common values without really knowing each other. Most informants claimed that
they trust their social networks. For example, Noemie compared her Facebook proﬁle
with a closet:
Facebook, when I post something, I feel more like I’m with my circle away
in, for example, a closet, and I will say, “I painted my baby’s room today.”
In the closet a person can have a recorder and a camera, but I trust the
people in the closet. (Personal interview, June  12, 2013)
It is a form of thin social trust that young adults place in their social networks. As
Donath (2007) said, “SNSs can actually increase trustworthiness, by placing people
within a context that can enforce social mores” (p.  236). Moreover, Putnam (2000,
chap.  8, para.  15) remarked that having or not having trust in individuals is linked to
social experiences. Only two informants experienced collusion of contexts on
Facebook. Therefore, most young adults in this study believed in the trustworthiness
of their contacts.
Implications for privacy debates
The problem with notice and consent (choice)
Findings from this study show that once users achieve the desired level of privacy, they
do not show an interest in privacy policies again. Young adults have to experience a
privacy violation in order to pay attention to these policies. Informants trusted SNSs
to a certain extent. At the same time, a form of opacity surrounds notice and consent.
Users recognized that privacy policies should be more clear, visible in the context
of use, and easily accessible. There are existing tensions between visibility as control and
visibility as recognition, which show that it is difﬁcult for users to manage privacy on so-
cial media. Findings indicate that there is a need for more transparency in privacy policies
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and the development of adequate contextual parameters. According to Etzioni (2015),
increasing transparency in institutional surveillance processes can be a means of inform-
ing the public about issues related to the collection of personal information.4 Hence, dif-
ferent measures could be adopted to revise notice and privacy policy language: 
1. Developing visible contextual parameters to inform users of architectural
changes. For example, notices of architectural changes could be inte-
grated in the News Feed and Mini Feed on Facebook.
2. Reducing the path that users must take to access privacy settings. For
example, to opt in and opt out of the use of personal information by ad-
vertisers, a user must leave the Facebook site and visit the Digital
Alliance Advertising site and read a series of terms of service before being
able to opt out. That user must check that third parties are not added to
the Facebook advertisers list. On Twitter, the information associated with
public accounts and protected tweets is accessible on the privacy policy
section page only after a user clicks on the “to know more” and “protect
my tweets” tabs.
3. Revising the discourses related to privacy policies. They are lengthy and
written in legal jargon. There is also a translation problem. Privacy poli-
cies have been translated literally from English to French, which shapes
their understanding by francophone users.
The promotion of transparency in SNS contexts could foster informed consent,
but does not guarantee privacy protection. As Nissenbaum (2011) argued, notice and
consent is problematic as new third parties such as advertisers or data mining compa-
nies are added to the list of actors that have access to personal information. Young
adults in this study were concerned that access to personal information had been
granted to several application owners on Facebook. Therefore, website owners should
try to adopt the contextual integrity approach (Nissenbaum, 2011). The objective is to
understand users’ privacy expectations and articulate those expectations with context-
based rules. Such an action could, in the words of Nissembaum (2011), “buttress in-
formed consent” (p.  45). The fact that young adults activated the adequate privacy
settings on Facebook after realizing that personal information was accessible to third
parties and invisible audiences indicates that they expect personal information to stay
in the context of use. Thus, context-speciﬁc informational norms being advertised by
website owners through privacy policies and TOS need to be clariﬁed, and users should
be notiﬁed appropriately when changes occur in the ﬂow of information. 
The need for critical media education
The privacy paradox shows that users internalize social control while being aware of
some risks associated with social surveillance practices. Informants did not seem con-
cerned about the use of personal information by institutions and third parties, because
they had a limited knowledge of the risks linked to institutional surveillance practices.
The existing relationship between surveillance and privacy was vague for these indi-
viduals. So, can a critical media education foster this type of knowledge?
In Québec, media education is integrated into the school curriculum at an early
age. Its aim is to “lead students to demonstrate a critical, ethical and aesthetic sense
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towards the media and to produce media documents respecting individual and col-
lective rights of groups” (MEES, 2015). The main objective is to develop a critical sense
among high school students by providing them with tools to understand both the ben-
eﬁts and the risks associated with their media uses. There is a focus in the media edu-
cation curriculum on “privacy and reputation.” However, it would be pertinent to
develop a teaching module on “knowledge of surveillance practices” and underline
the importance of privacy and accountability.
Steeves (2010) recognized the importance for teenagers and children to develop
a critical attitude toward privacy. Considering the speed at which the architectures of
social network sites are changing, young adults should also receive a critical media ed-
ucation, as what they learned about SNSs when they were teenagers is obsolete. It
would also be relevant to teach obfuscation techniques to show students the mecha-
nisms associated with institutional surveillance practices and how to protect their per-
sonal information. Brunton and Nissenbaum (2015) deﬁne obfuscation as “the
deliberate addition of ambiguous, confusing or misleading information to interfere
with surveillance and data” (p.  1). Knowing these techniques would allow users to
maintain a balance between disclosure and concealment of information. For example,
the software Facecloak enables Facebook users to make their identiﬁcation information
visible to a small circle of friends by encrypting them and saving them on a different
server than Facebook. Facecloak is one way to make information ambiguous and pro-
tect oneself from institutional and social surveillance. Using these techniques can con-
tribute to a better protection of privacy and a greater autonomy of action. As Marx
(2015) has written, “Subjecting surveillance and privacy-hungry technologies to critical
analysis and making them more visible and understandable hardly guarantees a just
and accountable society, but it is surely a necessary condition for one” (p.  126).
Conclusion
This ethnographic research of social media users’ privacy practices shows the complex
relationships between surveillance, visibility, and privacy. These results are contextual
and are related to this small group of users, who are university students. Users’ privacy
practices did not change after the interviews. It is necessary to further analyze how
different groups of Canadian young adults understand privacy as a concept, for it can
be deﬁned in multiple ways. It is also relevant to grasp users’ knowledge of privacy
laws to understand their level of privacy awareness. The privacy paradox cannot be
deﬁned only in terms of users taking risky opportunities, while being aware of some
privacy risks. It is shaped by various factors. Young Canadian users seem less aware of
the risks associated with the collection and use of personal information by institutions
and third parties than American users (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016; Raynes-Goldie,
2010; Young & Quan-Hasse, 2013). In the USA, Facebook gained popularity among
the population in 2004 (Boyd, 2008), and Twitter was launched in 2006. In Canada, it
was between 2009 and 2012 that a growing number of users joined Facebook and
Twitter (Cefrio, 2010, 2014). Informants started familiarizing themselves with SNSs
and privacy policies during this period and are still trying to grasp the ﬂow of infor-
mation on these online spaces. This ﬂow is complicated due to architectural changes,
the fact that users are uninformed about institutional surveillance practices, and the
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opacity surrounding notice and consent undermine privacy protection during social
interactions.
Findings show empirical support for the application of the contextual integrity
approach on social media. The way that TOS and privacy policies are presented on
SNSs and the frequent changes in the ﬂow of information raise several questions on
the nature and value of notice and consent and its propensity to provide the adequate
tools for privacy protection. Future research needs to explore what social media users
consider as adequate notice and informed consent, and how they engage with different
privacy policies and TOS across several social media platforms. Further, as Nissenbaum
(2011) explained, the privacy in public dilemma cannot be solved only through notice
and consent, though it can play an important role in privacy protection. The privacy
agenda is not only undermined by commercial purposes, but also by state surveillance.
In Canada, the ﬁfth principle of the fair information principles in the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA, n.d.) recognizes to a
certain extent the notion of context by limiting use, disclosure, and retention of per-
sonal information. However, with the adoption of Bill C-51 in Canada, anti-terror leg-
islation, privacy is also in danger. The internet police have the right to intercept private
communications on social media to ﬁght cyber-criminality and share users’ personal
information with federal agencies (Canada, Library of Parliament, 2015). Will social
media users have to retreat into self-censorship to protect their privacy? Will they have
to choose between freedom of expression and privacy? Collective efforts are required
to address the privacy paradox on social media and also the shift in privacy policies
and surveillance laws, which have tremendous repercussions on individual privacy in
this context.
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Notes
Social media sites are a family of applications that enable users to participate in the production and1.
sharing of content through interfaces that are user friendly. Such applications include wikis, virtual
social worlds, virtual games, social network sites and blogs (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010).
This research forms part of the author’s doctoral research, carried out from 2009 to 2016. For Hine2.
(2008), virtual ethnography is ethnography on, of, and through the internet.
I commented and “liked” users’ Facebook posts. After both interviews, I created a Facebook group3.
to keep users informed about my research and share information on surveillance and privacy issues.
I also replied to informants’ tweets.
Through the years, the Ofﬁce of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has provided privacy recom-4.
mendations in order that Canadians’ rights are respected when they are using SNSs (OPC, 2016).
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